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"The object of our study, then, is prediction, ... Theprophecies of what the
courts willdoin fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of Law (1897).
In the folklore of criminal justice a popular belief is that the accused
will have his case decided in a trial. Empirical evidence does not support
this belief. Table 1 indicates that most cases are disposed of before trial
by either a guilty plea or a dismissal of the charges. What factors deter-
mine the choice between a pretrial settlement and a trial? What accounts
for the large proportion of settlements compared to trials? How are cer-
tain aspects of the criminal justice process such as the bail system and
court delay related to the decision to settle or to go to trial? The main
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National Science Foundation to the National Bureau (Grant Number GS-33 14). The views
expressed in this essay are not attributable to the National Science Foundation, whose
support I gratefully acknowledge. I should like to thank Professors Gary Becker, Solomon
Fabricant, Laurence Miller, Sherwin Rosen, Finis Welch and Neil Wallace, and Elisabeth
Landes for helpful criticisms. 1 also received useful comments at seminars at the NBER,
Columbia, Rochester, U.C.L.A. and the University of Chicago. Charles H. Berry, Eugene
P. Foley, and Eli Goldston provided valuable advice as members of the reading committee
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Courts (1962) 1,394 19 5,293 70 823 11
U.S. District
Courts (1967) 31,5354,208 1323,131 734,196 13
SOURCES. —LeeSilverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in Amer-
ican State Courts, A Field Study and Report (2 v. 1965); Ann. Rep., Admin. Off.
of the United States Courts, 1967.
aNumberof felony defendants in sample.
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purpose of this essay is to answer these questions by means of a theoreti-
cal and empirical analysis of the criminal justice system using standard
tools of economic theory and statistics.
A theoretical model is first developed that identifies the variables
relevant to the choice between a settlement and a trial. The basic assump-
tion of the model is that both the prosecutor and the defendant maximize
their utility, appropriately defined, subject to a constraint on their re-
sources. It is shown that the decision to settle or to go to trial depends on
the probability of conviction by trial, the severity of the crime, the avail-
ability and productivity of the prosecutor's and defendant's resources,
trial versus settlement costs, and attitudes toward risk. We then analyze
the effects of the bail system and court delay on settlements, and consider
several proposals for improving the bail system and reducing court delay.
These include "preventive detention," monetary compensation to de-
fendants not released on bail, and the imposition of a money price for the
use of the courts. The model is further useful in evaluating the frequently
made argument that the criminal justice system discriminates against
low-income defendants. This proposition is analyzed by relating a de-
fendant's income or wealth to his decision to settle or go to trial, the
probability of his conviction, and his sentence if convicted. The interac-
tions of these factors with the bail system and court delay are also
examined.
The second part of this study is an empirical analysis from published
data on the disposition of cases in state and federal criminal courts.
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Multiple regression techniques are used to test the effects on the demand
for trials (or conversely, settlements) and on the probability of conviction
of the following: (1) pretrial detention; (2) court queues; (3) the size of the
potential sentence; (4) judicial expenditures; (5) subsidizing defendants'
legal fees; and (6) demographic variables such as population size, region,
county income, per cent nonwhite, and urbanization. Finally, in the
appendix a theoretical and empirical analysis on the demand for civil
cases is presented.
I. THE MODEL
We make the following assumptions.
(1) There are n defendants.
(2) The probability of conviction in a trial for the ith defendant
(i =1,...,n)depends on the prosecutor's and defendant's inputs of re-
sources,and R1 respectively, into the case. That is,
= R1; Z1)
and
F, =P1(Rr, Z,), (1)
where P7 is the prosecutor's, and P, is the defendant's estimates of the
probability of conviction by trial. P7 can be greater, less than, or equal to
P,.Z,denotes other factors affecting the level of P7 andfor example,
the availability of witnesses, the defendant's past record, his alibi, etc.
Inputs of R7 would tend to raise P7 and F1, while inputs of R would tend
to lower them so that
(3) The sentence,the defendant would receive if convicted in a
trial is known to the prosecutor and defendant and independent of R7
and R,.'
I. There is some justification for this assumption other than mathematical simplicity
since most crimes carry statutory penalties which are presumably known to both parties
and, independent of R'and However,statutory penalties usually set a minimum and
maximum sentence for the defendant convicted in a trial, and within this range the sen-
tence received would partly depend on andR.Toallow the sentence to be a function
of R'andwouldsubstantially complicate the model at this point (for example, two sen-
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(4) Initially, there is no money charge for the use of the courts nor a
nonmoney cost in terms of court delay or queues.
PROSECUTOR
Let the prosecutor's decision rule be to maximize the expected number of
convictions weighted by their respective S,'s —heprefers longer to shorter
sentences —subjectto a constraint on the resources or budget available to
his office (B).2 This decision rule coincides with the social optimum in
the following sense. If expected sentences are regarded as prices the com-
munity charges for various offenses, then the prosecutor's behavior is
equivalent to maximizing the community's "profit" for a given level of
prosecution expenditures.
The prosecutor maximizes E(C) where
E(C) = ± X(B —
f=I
which yields the equilibrium conditions
(3)
Thus, the prosecutor allocates greater resources to cases, ceteris paribus,
where the sentence is greater and whereis more responsive to changes
in R".3 If all ii defendants need not be prosecuted, one would also predict
charges would be dismissed when the prosecutor sees little chance of
conviction regardless of his resource input into the trial, or given a con-
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iS point (for example, two sen-
lences would have to be included—the defendant's estimate and the prosecutor's estimate)
without substantially changing the analysis of the trial versus settlement decision. In a later
section on wealth effects, I allow the sentence to be a function of resource inputs.
2. Other decision rules are possible; for example, maximizing the expected number of
convictions without weighting by the S1's. The difficulty here is that the prosecutor, in
order to increase his convictions and conserve his resources, would often be willing to
drop a murder charge against a suspected murderer if the latter agreed to plead guilty to
a minor offense (for example, a traffic violation). A simple way of eliminating this in the
model is to weight by the S's.(Seethe analysis of a settlement presented below.) Note that
fines could be included in S by specifying a rate at which the prosecutor transforms fines
into sentences keeping his utility constant.
3. We assume the price of a unit of Rj" is $1.00 and <0.It should also be
noted that (4) does not necessarily have a unique solution unless one assumes that the
prosecutor takes as given the defendant's inputs, R,'s. If he readjusts his inputs ofto
changes or anticipated changes in any of the R's, then the defendants may in turn readjust
their R1's. and so forth. This process need not converge to a unique solution.
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ciently general to give the prosecutor discretion over the type of charge
brought against each defendant. The charge selected would be one that
maximized E(C). Further, the maximization of E(C) together with the
assumption that 3P,"/I9Rr0 imply (possibly unrealistically) that the
prosecutor would suppress any evidence that reduces the probability of
conviction.
Scarce resources provide an incentive for the prosecutor to avoid a
trial and negotiate a pretrial settlement with the defendant. From (3)
and (4) it follows that if the prosecutor's transaction costs of a settlement
equal his optimal resource expenditure on a trial, he would be willing to
offer the suspect a reduction in the sentence below 5, in exchange for a
plea of guilty (which makes=P.= However, since trial costs
probably exceed these transaction costs, he would be willing to offer a
further sentence reduction as the savings in resources can be used to
increase the conviction probabilities in other cases. If denotes the
sentence reduction that is a positive function of the difference between the
prosecutor's trial costs and transaction costs of a settlement, then
So, = — (5)
whereis the minimum sentence th.e prosecutor is willing to offer the
defendant for a guilty plea.5 From (5) we note that the terms offered the
defendant will be more favorable the lower P" andand the greater the
prosecutor's resource saving from a settlement. Finally, suppose that cer-
tain cases bring the prosecutor considerable notoriety only if a trial Oc-
curs. If notoriety were desired, the sentence variable, S,, could be in-
creased by a notoriety factor (for example S.(l wherej,is a positive
function of the amount of notoriety and is Hence in some cases So,
could be greater than PrS, and even S,. Unless otherwise stated, we as-
sume So1 < Pt'S,.
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4. The prosecutor's transaction costs of a settlement would equal his time spent ex-
plaining the terms of the offer to the suspect and judge,paperworkin his office, etc. These
costswill generally be less than his total costs of reaching a settlement since the latter may
involve substantial negotiating or bargaining costs in order to arrive at a sentence more pre-
ferred than the minimum sentence he is willing to offer in a settlement.
5. A settlement that releases resources from any one case will increase the Ri"s in
other cases. Thus, the that initially satisfy (4) are not the final equilibrium values be-
cause adjustments take place as cases aresettled.Moreover, these adjustments raise the
So's in cases not yet settled. I largely ignore these secondary effects in the analysis.
defendant.
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DEFENDANT
If the defendant goes to trial, the outcome is either of two mutually exclu-
sive states: a conviction state with an endowment Wc defined as
Wc =W—sS —rR




W is his wealth endowment prior to arrest, s equals the present value of
the average pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses per unit of jail sentence,r
is the average price of a unit of R, and S and R are defined as before..6
I assume Wc is nonnegative.
Let U be a continuous utility function over the defendant's endow-
ment. His expected utility from going to trial is then
E(U)PU(Wc) + (1 —P)U(Wn). (7)
Since inputs of R lower F, Wc and Wn, the defendant would select a level
of R to maximize E(U) such that
—P'[U(Wn) —U(Wc)]=r[PU'(Wc)+ (1 —P)U'(Wn)], (8)
where p' =dP/dRand U' denotes the marginal utility (>0) of the en-
dowment in each state.7 The left-hand side of (8) represents marginal
returns of R and the right-hand side, marginal costs of R.8 An analysis of
the determinants of the optimal R is presented later.
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6. The subscript iis deleted, since it is explicit that we are now dealing with one
defendant.
7. The qualification stated in footnote 3 regarding the prosecutors equilibrium inputs
of R* also applies to the defendant's equilibrium inputs of R.
8. The second-order condition for the optimum R requires that the rate of change of
marginal returns be less than the rate of change of marginal cost. That is,
—P"[U(Wn) —U(Wc))+ rP'[U'(Wn) —U'(Wc)]<
—rP'[U'(Wn)—U(Wc)]—r2[PU"(Wc)+ (I —P)U"(Wn)J,
where P" =d2P/dR2,and U" =therate of change of U'. P' is assumed >0 to indicate
diminishing marginal product of R in reducing P. If U" =0,the last three terms above are
zero and hence marginal returns are falling while marginal costs are constant. If U"0,170 AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS
TRIAL VERSUS SETTLEMENT
Let requal the defendant's transaction costs of a settlement.9 Note
that the defendant's trial costs, rR,are greater than rRbecause a
defendant going to trial will in the process of rejecting a settlement incur
most of the costs in rR,and in addition he has expenditures on the trial.
The defendant would choose between a trial or settlement on the basis of
whether his expected utility from the former, E(U), were greater or less
than his utility from the latter. Similarly, the prosecutor would choose the
alternative that maximizes his conviction function, E(C). Therefore, a
necessary condition for a settlement is that both the defendant and prose-
cutor simultaneous'y gain from a settlement compared to their expected
trial outcomes. This requires that
irU(W—s.So—rj
because one can then find a negotiated sentence somewhat greater than
So, the minimum offer of the prosecutor, that leaves the defendant with a
utility from a settlement greater than E(U) and at the same time increases
E(C) for the prosecutor above its value in a trial. Although (9) explicitly
allows for the prosecutor's and defendant's transaction costs of a settle-
inent, the attempt to reach mutually acceptable terms may in certain cases
involve substantial bargaining costs that are large enough to prevent a
settlement even though ir > 0. In spite of this qualification, I will assume
that 7T>0 is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for a
settlement. Alternatively, IT<0 is a necessary and sufficient condition
for a trial. These conditions are Pareto optimal in that if rr > 0, both
parties expect to gain from a settlement, and if< 0, both parties ex-
pect to gain from a trial.
We can derive the following implications from (9) regarding the like-
lihood of settling and the resulting sentence.
1. Although the precise sentence in a pretrial settlement is inde-
terminate, it must lie between the extremes defined by (9). Within this
range it would depend on the relative bargaining strengths of the parties
involved. In general, one would expect a smaller negotiated sentence the
marginal costs may be rising, falling or constant with increases in R since the two terms on
the right-hand side are of opposite sign. Similarly, when U" <0,marginal returns may
actually rise since rP'[U'(Wn)— U'(Wc)]is positive but when U"> 0, marginal returns
must fall.
9. Similar to the definition of the prosecutor's transaction costs (see supra note 4), rR
would be generally less than the defendant's total costs of negotiating a settlement since
excludes bargaining costs.
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smaller the probability of conviction in a trial. A smaller P raises E(U)
and thus lowers the maximum sentence accepted by the defendant, while
a smaller P" reduces the minimum acceptable to the prosecutor. For
identical reasons, a lower sentence if convicted by trial, S, should lead to
a lower negotiated sentence.
2. ir will be positive and a settlement chosen whenever
sSo < r(R — (10)
sincethisimplies U(W —sSo —> U(Wn), and by definition
U(Wn)E(U). This result is independent of the defendant's attitude
toward risk and his estimate of the conviction probability, because re-
gardless of the trial outcome he is always better off with a settlement. (10)
implies that a trial is less likely for offenses with small expected sentences
(since So depends on S and p*) lelative to the defendant's differential
cost of going to trial, r(R —R).'°Except when explicitly stated to the
contrary, I now assume sSo > r(R —so that Wn is greater than
(WsSo —rR).
3.If both parties agree on the probability of conviction by trial
P), a settlement will take place for defendants who are risk averse
(U" < 0) or risk neutral (U'1 =0).h1When P" =P,one can show that a
trial is equivalent to an unfair gamble (that is. the expected trial endow-
ment is less than the settlement endowment).'2 Risk neutral suspects
maximize their expected endowment and, therefore, refuse the trial
"gamble," and a fortiori risk averse suspects also refuse the "gamble."
On the other hand, a trial can still occur for a risk preferrer (U" > 0)
even though P.13
10. This provides an explanation of why many persons plead guilty to traffic violations
instead of spending considerable time in traffic court disputing them.
11. U" denotes the rate of change of U' with respect to one's endowment.
12. A trial is an unfair gamble if
which can be rewritten as
(W—s .So—rJ?)—[P. Wc+(l —P)W,i] >0,
sAS + r(R —R)>0,
(i)
(ii)
using (5), (6a, 6b)andthe assumption= P.Since we have assumed sAS and r(R —
are both positive, (ii) holds and the gamble is unfair.
13. Given risk preference, a negative ir,whichleads to a trial, would be more likely
the greater the preference for risk, the larger rR, and the smaller sAS and rR. To prove
this differentiate (9) partially with respect to these variables. The partial derivatives are
negative for andpositive for sAS and rR, indicating thatfalls with respect to in.
creases in rR and decreases in sAS and rR.172 AN ECONOMICANALYSiSOFTHE COURTS
4. Suppose the prosecutor and defendant differ in their estimates of
the trial conviction probability. If<P, a trial becomes an even less
favorable gamble in comparison to=P,and hence risk averse and
risk neutral suspects would continue to settle.'4 Risk preferrers are also
more likely to settle sincein(9) rises. P4 > P is the more interesting
case because this provides an explanation in addition to risk preference
of why trials occur. When>P a trial becomes a more favorable
gamble compared to P" =P,and hence ir falls, increasing the chances of
a trial. Moreover, if P4 > P, one can show that the likelihood of a trial is
generally greater for defendants accused of crimes that carry stronger
penalties.'5
Several additional points are worth noting in regard to the settlement
versus trial decision:
5. The greater the savings in costs from a settlement, other things the
same, the smaller So and rR, and the more likely a settlement. This sug-
gests that policy measures designed to eliminate or subsidize the defend-
ant's legal fees, which in turn reduce the cost differential between a trial
and a settlement, will increase the proportion of trials.
6. Suppose a not-guilty verdict in a trial produces pecuniary and non-
pecuniary returns to the defendant. This would raise E(U) and make a
trial more likely. Similarly, publicity gains to the prosecutor from a trial
would raise So, as previously noted, and also make a trial more likely.
7. The question of whether the defendant did in fact commit the
crime he is charged with does not explicitly enter the analysis. The pros-
ecutor and defendant have been assumed to react to the probability of
14. As P4 falls, Sofalls,which in turn increases (W— sSo — Similarly,the
increase in Plowers [PWc +(1 —P)Wn]. Thus,the value of(i) in footnote 12 rises relative
tothecase where=P.Since (i) is already >0 when= F,it is obviously >0 when
P* <P.
15.Differentiating irwithrespect to S and noting that SoP4S — (see (5))
yields arrIaS0 according as
PU'(W—s-So--rR)
U'(Wc)
<0when U"0 since U'(W —sSo —rA)a U'(Wc) and P < P4. Thus, risk
preferring and risk neutral defendants are more likely to go to trial as S rises given P4 > P.
When U" < 0 risk aversion), both sides of (i) are <1, and the sign of is indeter-
minate. However, if the degree of risk aversion is weak (the right-hand side of (i) is close to
one), risk averters are also more likely to go to trial as S rises.
In another sense, the likelihood of a trial is greater for large than for small
sentences. \Ve have already shown in (10) that a trial will not occur when sSo is less than
the difference in costs between a trial and a settlement, r(R —R).Thus, for very small
sentences r(R —is likely to dominate and a settlement will take place.
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conviction and other variables in choosing between settling and going to
trial, while their behavior has not been directly influenced by the actual
guilt or innocence of the defendant. However, this factor may enter in
two ways. First, the amount and quality of the evidence against the de-
fendant seems likely to diminish in the case of an innocent person. This
would reduce the probability of conviction in a trial or even lead the
prosecutor to dismiss charges more readily since P* may be close to zero.
Second, an innocent person may have an aversion to lying so that he
would have a greater reluctance to plead guilty to an offense than a guilty
person. This can be interpreted as imposing psychic losses on a guilty
plea for an innocent suspect which would reduce U(W —sSo —
in(9) and hence increase the likelihood of a trial.
8. We observed in the introduction that a large fraction of cases are
settled before trial. Our analysis predicts this if in most cases the pros-
ecutor and suspect agree on the expected outcome of a trial, the costs of a
trial to both parties exceed their settlement costs, and suspects are gen-
erally risk averse in their trial versus settlement choice.
WEALTH AND SENTENCE EFFECTS
In this section two further questions are considered. (1) Do the resources
(R) invested by the defendant in a trial rise as the sentence increases? (2)
Do the resources invested increase with the level of the defendant's initial
endowment or wealth? The latter question is directly related to the wide-
spread claim that the criminal justice system works less favorably for low
income suspects than for affluent ones,'6 because if the defendant's invest-
ment of resources rises with wealth, then both the probability of convic-
tion in a trial and a negotiated sentence would tend to be lower for
wealthier defendants.
To determine the effect of an increase in the sentence, we take the
total differential of the first-order condition in (8) with respect to S and
R)7 This yields dR/dS0 according as
16. See Patricia M. Wald, Poverty and Criminal Justice, in U.S. Pres. Comm'n on Law
Enforcement and Admin. of Justice, Task Force on the Admin. of Justice, Task Force
Report: The Courts, at 139, app. C (1967).
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The second-order condition for E(U) to be a maximum requires that the denominator be
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where —U"(Wc)/U'(Wc) is a measure of absolute risk aversion. From (11)
it follows that dR/dS > 0 for defendants who are risk preferrers or risk
neutral. If defendants are risk averse,sign of dR/dS is uncertain. It is
more likely to be positive the more responsive P to increases in R, the
lower r, and the smaller the level of absolute risk aversion.'8 In sum, for a
group of defendants differing in their attitudes toward risk, we might
expect to find a greater investment of resources on average for defend-
ants charged with crimes carrying longer sentences. Note that this need
not lead to an observed negative relation between the probability of con-
viction and the severity of the crime since we have previously shown that
an increase in the potential sentence also induces the prosecutor to al-
locate more resources to the case.
The value of one's time is generally related positively to one's income
and wealth. In consequence, an increase in the defendant's wealth will
lead to an increase both in r and s, the prices per unit of R and S respec-
tively. To show this for r, let R be produced by both inputs of market
goods such as the services of lawyers, expert witnesses, etc., and inputs
of one's time. The optimal input combination is where the marginal prod-
ucts of the inputs over their respective marginal factor costs are equal.
Since defendants with greater wealth attach higher prices to their time
input, they would not only substitute more market intensive methods of
producing R, but would also have a higher r.'9 Moreover, it follows from
the equilibrium condition in (8) that a rise in r will lead to fewer inputs of
R. In contrast, the increase in s as wealth rises will usually result in an
increase in R.2° Thus, to predict the net effect of an increase in wealth,
18. (11) may also be rewritten as
where c is the elasticity of P with respect to R, rR/Wc is the share of R in the suspect's
Conviction wealth, and —WcU"(Wc)/U'(Wc)isa measure of relative risk aversion. The
value of the latter is often argued to hover around 1. (See Kenneth Arrow, Aspects of the
Theory of Risk-Bearing, 33—37 (1965).) Thus, if rR/Wc were small, one would expect
dRIdS >0for risk averse suspects.
19. If higher income or wealth defendants are more productive in their use of time to
produce R. then the marginal product of time would be positively related to income. This
would work to offset the substitution of market inputs for time as income and wealth rose.
Further, r need not increase with wealth.
20. The condition under which dRids >0is identical to that for dR/dS >0in (11).WILLIAM M. LANDES 175
which increases both r and s, one would have to determine the relative
(11) magnitudes of these two offsetting forces. In addition, a change in wealth
even if s and r were to remain constant may change the equilibrium input
of R if tastes for risk depend on wealth. We analyze below the case of risk
neutrality and in the mathematical appendix we consider nonneutral
tastes for risk.
The total differential of (8) with respect to W and R, assuming risk
(12)
where E5 = as/a W(W/s) and Er = ar/aW(W/r). Er will be <1 since the
price of market inputs is unaffected and some substitution of market
inputs for time takes place as wealth rises. E5 can be assumed equal to I
because as a first approximation the per unit value of time in jail is pro-
portional to wealth. The optimality condition for R (see (8)) becomes with
risk neutrality —P' = rlsS, and, therefore, dR/dW will be positive when
E2.> Er.21 Thus, the amount of resources invested in a trial would tend
to rise and the probability of conviction would tend to fall with increases
in wealth. Note that this result also implies a lower negotiated sentence
for wealthier defendants.22
Suppose that the penalty for conviction is not a jail sentence but in-
stead a money fine. E5 would equal zero with a fine since changes in the
value of time do not alter the dollar value of a fine, and dR/dW would be
negative. Therefore, the effect of wealth on R reverses when penalties
21. An identical result holds when R affects not only P but also S. With risk neutrality,
the first-order condition for the optimal R becomes
—P'(s .S)—P(sS') =r, (i)
where S' =aS/aR0. The total differential of (i) with respect to W and R yields dRIdW
Oas
E,[—P'(sS) —P(s.S')JE,4r, (ii)
which gives dRIdW0 as
E,E,.. (iii)
22. An increase in R that is anticipated by the prosecutor would lower andhence
his minimum offer, So, while the reduction in P would raise the defendant's expected utility
from a trial and lower the maximum sentence he would accept to settle. Other things the
same, these forces should work to lower the negotiated sentence.
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are in terms of money and not time for risk neutral defendants.23 Once
risk aversion or preference is introduced, the effect of changes in wealth
on R cannot in general be specified unless one has explicit knowledge of
additional parameters of the defendant's utility function. Nevertheless,
one can presume that if the deviation from risk neutrality is small, the
effects of wealth on R will follow the effects for risk neutrality.
II. SOME APPLICATIONS
THE BAIL SYSTEM
In the United States the typical procedure for bail is that shortly after the
defendant's arrest a bond is set as security for his appearance at trial. If
the defendant can post the amount of the bond through a deposit of cash
or other assets, or have a professional bondsman do it for him, he is re-
leased until trial. The bondsman's fee runs about 10 per cent of the value
of the bail bond. If the defendant does not meet the bail requirement, he
remains in jail. The bond is generally forfeited should the released de-
fendant fail to appear at trial.
Several implications of the bail system can be derived from our
model.
1. Bail costs would be deducted from the defendant's endowment,
W, so that both U(W —sSo —rR)and E(U) in (9) would fall. For
defendants released on bail there would be no obvious change in(since
equal dollar amounts are subtracted from (W —sSo — Wc and
Wn) and hence no reason to expect a change in their use of trials com-
pared to settlements. Bail costs for defendants not released would equal
the opportunity cost of their time in prison plus losses from restrictions on
their consumption and freedom. These costs would be greater for a trial
than a settlement because the delay in reaching trial generally exceeds
the time taken to negotiate a settlement.24 This in turn would lower E(U)
23. G. S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, this volume,
presents a similar argument without presenting a proof. However, he argues that the incen-
tive to use time to reduce the probability of a sentence is unrelated to earnings, and the in-
centive to use money to reduce the probability of a fine is also unrelated to earnings. These
results would follow when in the former case Risproduced solely by time and in the latter
case Risproduced solely by market inputs. However, once Risproducedboth time and
market inputs there is always an incentive to substitute market inputs for time as earnings
rise.
24. Empirically, the time difference appears to be positive. For example, in the 89
United States district courts the median queues in 1967 were as follows: jury trial
5.7months;court trial =3.9months, and settlement (guilty plea) =1.9months. See, 1967
Ann. Rep. Admin. Off. of the United States Courts, 269—71, table D6.
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relative to U(W —sSo —in (9), raise ir and make a settlement
more likely for defendants not released on bail. Thus, given a positive
time differential between a trial and settlement one would predict pro-
portionately more settlements among defendants not released than those
released on bail.25
2. The defendant in jail is restricted in his use of resources to reduce
the probability of conviction. This can be interpreted as either raising the
costs or lowering the marginal products of his market and time inputs. For
example, in the case of market inputs, detention would hamper consulta-
tion with lawyers, and in the case of time inputs, the defendant would
have greater (even prohibitive) difficulty in seeking out witnesses and in
engaging in other investigatory activities. These factors increase the mar-
ginal cost of producing a given Randlower the defendant's input of
R.20Thus,other things the same, the probability of conviction by trial
should be greater for defendants not making bail than for those making
bail.21 As noted earlier, a higher probability of conviction by trial also
leads to worse terms in a settlement. One should add that for these rea-
Sons the prosecutor always has an incentive to request the judge to set
high bail charges.
3. Finally, if making bail is positively correlated with income, then
25.Two additional points should be noted. (a) If the defendant not released on bail
weregiven credit toward his sentence for time in prison prior to disposition of his case,
the only bail deduction in (9) would be from Wn,thedefendant's endowment if he is not
convicted. ir would still rise. However, the rite in ITwouldbe negatively related to the
probability of conviction. In the limit, if the probability of conviction equaled 1, court delay
would leave irunchanged.(b) Bail costs of defendants released on bail will generally notbe
greater for a trial than a settlement. The bondsman's fee is independent of whether the
defendant goes to trial or accepts a settlement, and a majority of felony defendants who
make bail use bondsmen. (See, Lee Silverstein, Bail in the State Courts —AField Study and
Report, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 621, 647—52 (1966).) And the returns from assets (except cash)
used as security for bail bonds will continue to be received by the owner.
26. Defendants not making bail may have available added resources for legal services
that would have been used to finance bail. These can offset the higher costs of Rsothat
the probability of conviction need not increase. However, it is also possible that their
resources will decline should the loss in income (excluding a consumption allowance)
exceed the cost of financing bail. In the latter case, capital market difficulties would presum-
ably have prevented their release.
27. Critics of the bail system have recognized this point. For example, see Report of
the Att'y Gen. Comm. on Poverty & the Adrnin. of Fed. Crim. Just 74—76 (1963). Also
note that the increase in cost of Rforjailed defendants may be partly offset by the greater
availability of "legal" advice from other inmates. However, if this factor were sufficiently
important, one would observe defendants who were able to meet bail requirements accepting
pretrial detention instead.178 AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS
the effects of pretrial jailing, cited above, would fall most heavily on low-
income defendants.
Proposals for bail reform generally focus on eliminating income as an
indirect criterion of pretrial release. The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966
requires that criminal defendants in federal courts (which cover a small
minority of criminal defendants) be released prior to trial unless there is
reason to believe they would flee. The "President's Commission" sug-
gests placing greater reliance on release of defendants without bail, ac-
companied by certain restrictions on their behavior (for example, restric-
tions on travel, associations), while simultaneously confining suspects
whose release would pose a significant threat to the community, regard-
less of their financial ability to make bail,28 the latter provision being a
form of "preventive detention." if these reforms were to result in the
pretrial release of more defendants and more low-income ones we would
predict the following: a decline in the negative correlations between in-
come and the effects of pretrial jailing outlined above; a reduction in the
fraction of defendants convicted since fewer defendants would be re-
stricted in their use of R; and an increase in the demand for trials as
differential bail costs between a trial and settlement go to zero for more
defendants.29 The latter would probably increase court delay.
These reforms leave persons detained in the same position as before
and, moreover, their position relative to defendants released may worsen
if the latter group does not pay for their release. Suppose those detained
were paid a monetary compensation that increased with the length of their
detention. We could then eliminate much of the discriminatory aspects
of the bail system while still detaining persons believed to be dangerous.
A higher marginal cost of R for detained suspects would still be present,
but they would have additional resources to mitigate the adverse effects
of this on the probability of conviction. Compensation would reduce the
defendant's incentive for a settlement as the differential bail costs be-
tween a trial and settlement decline and approach zero for full compensa-
tion. If compensation were paid out of the prosecutor's budget, the latter's
incentive for a settlement would increase given that the payment were
greater for a trial than a settlement. This in turn would lower his mini-
mum offer, So, and raise U(W —So— in(9). Hence, the incentive
28. U.S. Pres. Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Admin. ofJustice, Task Force on the
Admin. of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts, at 38—40 (1967). [Hereinafter, The
Courts.]
29. Other effects could be added. For instance, a predicted increase in crime from re-
ducing the average probability of conviction, and a savings in resources used for pretrial
detention.
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for a settlement need not fall with compensation. Note as So falls this
tends to reduce the positive difference between negotiated sentences for
•defendants not released compared to defendants released on bail.3°
COURT DELAY
It is widely recognized that the courts are burdened with a larger volume
of cases than they can efficiently handle. The results are often long delays
prior to trial, and hasty considerations when cases reach trial.3' This is
not surprising since users pay a nominal money fee, if any, and a queue
develops to ration the supply.
• To understand the implications of nonmoney and money pricing on
the demand for courts, assume initially there is a money price, M, paid
by the loser that clears the market.:32 We also assume that the prosecutor's
budget is not increased to cover these court costs. M affects both the
prosecutor's and defendant's demand for trial. First, it reduces the mini-
mum sentence offered by the prosecutor, So in (5), by a positive function
of (1 —P*).Al.This, in turn, raises 'ir in (9) and increases the likeli-
hood of a settlement. Second, it lowers the defendant's wealth if convicted
by trial, Wc, by an amount equal to Al, reducing E(U) and raising ir in
(9). This also increases the chance of a settlement. The larger is M. the
greater the increase in IT, and the more settlements that take place. Thus,
a downward sloping demand curve for the courts is generated. Further,
one can venture from the analysis of (9) that as Iv! rises, the reduction in
quantity demanded of trials (hereafter, trial demand) will be primarily
from cases where there is not a significant disagreement between the pros-
ecutor and defendant over the probability of conviction, and where the
sentence if convicted by trial tends to be small.33 Put differently, cases
that still go to trial as M rises are where there are significant disagree-
ments over the probability of conviction and where penalties are severe.
Moreover, changing the allocation of the payment of M has little effect on
the above results, since whether the loser or winner pays M, or both share
M, a money price always increases IT in (9) and reduces trial demand.
30. For a detailed analysis of alternative bail systems see my paper, The Bail System:
An Economic Approach, this volume.
31. The Courts. supranote28, at 80—90.
32. This does not mean that defendants are immediately brought to trial. Some time is
required by both defendant and prosecutor to prepare a case for trial. Current delays are
alleged to run considerably in excess of this.
33. Optimal values ofF, R* and 1? may change as Al rises since the prosecutor and
defendant must now allocate some resources to losses from expected court fees.180 AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS
Compare this pricing scheme with one in which the courts are heavily
subsidized, taking the extreme example of a zero money price. As M goes
to zero, So and Wcrise,ir falls and without an increase in supply, trial
demand would exceed supply. Let us assume trial dates are allocated on
the basis of waiting time since arraignment and a trial queue develops.
The queue will reach an equilibrium size because, as we will show, trial
demand is a decreasing function of waiting or queueing time. An increase
in the queue imposes losses on the prosecutor as it (a) reduces the number
of convictions in the current year from cases commenced in that year by
delaying trial convictionand (b) ties up resources in a case for a longer
period of time. These losses increase as the queue lengthens, inducing the
prosecutor to offer a lower sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. Al-
though U(W —sSo —rR)in (9) then rises (as So falls) the incentive
for the defendant to settle as the queue grows will depend on whether or
not he is released on bail. For defendants not released, the longer the
queue the higher the bail costs of a trial and hence the lower their expected
utility from a trial.35 This factor, together with the response of the prose-
cutor, leads to the prediction that the demand for trials will fall as the
queue lengthens for defendants not released on bail. On the other hand,
for defendants released on bail the net effect on their expected utility of
an increase in the queue is unclear. The discounted loss from a sentence
received in a trial would diminish or increase as the penalty is pushed into
the future, depending on whether earnings are rising at a slower or faster
rate than the defendant's discount rate. In addition, the defendant's
earnings may be adversely affected during the period he is free on bail due
to his being under indictment. If on balance their expected utility falls or
remains constant and the prosecutor's losses rise, one would expect an
increase in IT and a reduction in trial demand as the queue lengthens for
defendants free on bail. However, one would predict that the demand for
trials among defendants released would be less responsive to an increase
in the queue than the demand among defendants not released, since the
34. Even if the prosecutor had no time preference with respect to Convictions, an
increase in the queue would still impose losses on him. For example, suppose the prosecutor
is in office for 5 years. An increase in the queue during his tenure would lead to fewer con-
victions and a lower weighted conviction function than a constant queue because he will
have left to his successor a greater stock of cases than his predecessor had left to him.
35. This would be partially offset by giving credit towards the eventual sentence for
time spent in jail awaiting trial. W would be unchanged as the queue lengthened, providing
the time spent in jail awaiting trial was less than 5, but Wn would still fall. Hence, E(U)
would continue to fall as the queue increased.
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These points are illustrated in Figure 1, where Qt =trialqueue,
Q,,= pretrialsettlement queue, and T =fractionof trials per unit of time.
D1 and D2 denote the trial demand curves for defendants not released and
released on bail, respectively. Assume initially that there is no money
charge for trials, the number of defendants not released on bail equals the
number released, and credit against one's sentence is not given for pre-
trial detention. When —= 0,Twould be the same for defendants
released and not released, since the differential bail costs between a trial
and settlement are zero for both groups. As — rises,due to a re-
duction in supply of trial services, the differential bail costs rise by a
greater amount for the not released than for the released defendants and
hence the reduction in trials will tend to be greater for the former than the
latter group. Thus, D1 diverges from D2 as (Qt — increases.If the
equilibrium queue initially equaledTwould equal T1 for defendants
not released and T2 for defendants released. Suppose a money charge for
trials is established that is sufficient to reduce (Q,— tozero, keeping
the number of trials constant. As a first approximation, the demand curves
for trials of the released and not released defendants would be identical
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zero for both groups.36 If the defendant's trial fee were set at M1, a price
that equals the maximum amount that defendants who are not released
would pay at the margin for the same number of trials in order to reduce
(Q1— tozero, the aggregate number of trials demanded would be less
than the available supply as 2T1 < T1 + T2.37 In order for demand to be
equated with supply, the defendant's court fee must be less than M. Let A?
inFigure 1 equal the market clearing court fee. At M the fraction of trials
for each group would equal T3 and by assumption, 2T3 =T1+ T2. Thus,
a money charge for the courts that kept constant the number of trials can
lead to an increase in the use of the courts on the part of defendants not
released on bail, and a reduction in use among defendants released on
bail. Moreover, if the supply curve of trials were positively sloped with
respect to a money price, one would also expect an increase in the total
number of trials.
In sum, we should note that although a zero money price is often
advocated as a means of not discouraging low-income defendants from
using the courts, its effect can be the opposite. A zero price operating
with a bail system that tends to detain in jail low-income defendants will
discourage the latter group from going to trial. In contrast, an appropriate
money price may reduce the demand for the courts of defendants released
on bail, and by reducing the trial queue can increase the use of the courts
by defendants who do not make bail.36 Surprisingly, the literature that
criticizes court delay makes no mention of the possibility of charging a
money price, which not only reduces delay, but can distribute the use of
the courts more equally among defendants independent of their ability
to make bail.
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THE DEMAND FOR Tt
The theoretical
criminal trials:
36. Note thatthedemand curves may differ. For example, if the average wealth of re-
leased defendants exceeds that of jailed defendants and the wealth elasticity of trial demand
is not zero, then the demand curve of the former group will be to the right of D1. However, as
long as it is still to the left of D2, the results that follow will still hold.
37. The prosecutor's court fee as (Q, —Q,,)falls to zero must be large enough to keep
So constant. if other methods of allocating court fees (for example, winner or loser pays)
were used, we could no longer assume that D, is the demand curve when trials are priced.
Although the geometry would become more complicated when different pricing schemes are
used, the results of the analysis would not be substantially altered.
38. An alternative scheme that would produce similar results is to continue a zero
money price for the courts but allow defendants to buy and sell their places on the queue.
This would presumably reduce the differential costs between a trial and settlement for
defendants not released on ball relative to those released, and hence lead to a shift in court
use from the latter to the former group. For example, if SX =theequilibrium price for a place
in the queue that makes (Q, —Q9)=0,the differential trial cost would be $X for both
defendants released and not released, and their trial demands would be approximately equal.
39. Lee Silverstein, Def
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III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In the legal area readily accessible and systematically collected data are
quite limited. However, two sources of data were found that make it
possible to test a number of the important hypotheses in the theoretical
model. The first source is an American Bar Foundation (ABF) study, in
which over 11,000 felony defendants in 1962 were sampled from state
court dockets in nearly 200 counties.39 From this sample we can estimate
for several counties within most states the number of defendants released
on bail and their average bail charge, the number going to trial, and the
number dismissed, acquitted and sentenced. The second major source of
data is for the 89 U.S. district courts where annually published statistics
on civil and criminal cases are available.40 These data contain information
of civil and criminal court queues, the number of cases going to trial, the
disposition of cases, and the number of criminal defendants receiving
subsidized legal services. It should be added that most criminal defend-
ants have their cases decided in state not in U.S. courts. In 1962 about
300,000 persons were charged with felonies in the state courts, while
about 30,000 criminal defendants annually have their cases disposed in
the U.S. district courts.4'
THE DEMAND FOR TRIALS
The theoretical analysis suggests the following demand function for
criminal trials:
e. if the average wealth of re-
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T =f(B, Q,, S,D, U), (13)
39. Lee Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in American State Courts,
A Field Study and Report (2 v. 1965). Note that a felony is generally defined as any crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than one year.
40. See various years of the Ann. Rep. Admin. Off. of the United States Courts and
Fed. Offenders in the United States District Courts 1967.
41. Lee Silverstein, supranote39, at 7—8 and Ann. Rep., Admin. Off. of the United
States Courts, supranote40. The types of offenses also differ in the state and U.S. courts.
Offenses in the U.S. courts include forgery, counterfeiting, interstate transportation of
stolen goods and vehicles, postal theft, and violation of immigration laws, liquor laws
and other federal statutes, while it includes few cases of murder, assault, robbery, and
other "violent" crimes. The latter types of offenses are concentrated in state courts. The
one exception is the U.S. district court in the District of Columbia which handles all crim-
inal offenses in the area. In the empirical analysis of the U.S. Courts I have excluded the
District of Columbia in order to have comparable offenses across districts.184 AN ECONOMICANALYSIS OF THECOURTS
where T is the fraction of defendants going to trial, B is the fraction of
defendants released on bail, QtandQ.arethe average trial and pretrial
settlement queues respectively, S is the average sentence if convicted by
trial, D is the average cost differential between a trial and settlement, and
U is the combined effect of all other factors.42 We would predict on the
basis of our model that B, andS will have positive effects on T, while
QtandD will have negative effects on T. Unfortunately, data limitations
prevent us from estimating the partial effects of these variables in a single
equation. The ABF sample of state county courts has no data on queues
or cost differentials between trials and settlements, while the data for the
U.S. courts contain no information on bail. Therefore, the analysis will
use the ABF data to test bail effects, and the U.S. data to test queue
effects. At the same time we will point out possible biases and alternative
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STATE COUNTY COURTS
Least-squares multiple regression equations were estimated across state
county courts in 1962. These equations were of the following general
form:
T=a+f31B+f32S+f33Pop+/34Re+f35NW+f36Ur+/37Y+u.(14)
The variables in (14) are defined as follows:
T: the fraction of defendants in a county court whose cases were dis-
posed of by trial in 1962. Cases where a plea of guilty was made at time
of trial are not counted as trials.
B: the fraction of defendants in each county released on bail in 1962.
S: the average time served of first-released prisoners in 1964 who
had sentences of one year or longer. S is an estimate of the average sen-
tence, if convicted by trial, of felony defendants in 1962. Releases in
1964 are used because the average time served in state prisons of first-
released prisoners was about two years, and hence 1964 should be the
average release year for defendants sentenced in 1962.
42. U would include factors derived from the irfunction(equation (9)) such as the
distribution of estimates of the probability of conviction by trial, and attitudes toward
risk. I have not been able to directly measure these variables and hence they are largely
ignored in the empirical analysis. U also includes several demographic variables that will
be specified in the statistical estimation of (13).
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Pop: county population in 1960.
Re: region dummy variable that equals 1 for counties in South and 0
for non-South counties.
NW: per cent nonwhite population in county in 1960.
Ur: per cent urban population in county in 1960.
Y: median family income in county in 1959.
Weighted regressions on T are presented in Table 2 for counties in
the U.S., the non-South and South.43 in the U.S. and non-South equations
(2.1—2.2) the regression coefficients of the bail variable have the pre-
dicted positive sign and are always highly significant, while in the South
the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Before discussing
these results in greater detail, an interesting interpretation can be given




where N is the number of defendants, N1 is the number not released on
bail, and N2 is the number released. A1 and A2 are the average propensities
to go to trial of the not released and released group respectively. The
theory predicts that A2 > A1, providing that the trial queue is longer than
the settlement queue. Since N1/N + N2/N =1and N2/N =B,(15) can
be rewritten as
T =A1+ (A2 —A1)B. (16)
Therefore, from a set of observations on T and B, the intercept in a
simple regression of T on B would be an estimate of A1 and the beta co-
efficient on B would be an estimate of(A2 —A1).A positive beta coefficient
would be consistent with the prediction that A2 > A1. The interpretations
of these regression coefficients are modified with the addition of other
independent variables,which enter the regression indirectly through




I (equation (9)) such as the
trial, and attitudes toward
and hence they are largely
ographic variables that will
I
43. Observations were weighted by the where n is the number of defendants
sampled in each county. The range of ,i is from 3 to 349 with a mean of 58, and n generally
rises with the size of the county population. Weighted regressions were computed because
of the likelihood of larger variances in the residuals as ii declined. However, unweighted
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and
A2 =c2+ (18)
By substitution into (16) we have,
j j
T=+ (c2 —c1)B+ + —j33BX,. (19)
Estimates of equation (19) were not successful because of the large
amount of multicollinearity resulting from the inclusion of interaction
variables. This tended to eliminate statistical significance from any of
the independent variables. However, if we set a1 =f3.for all =2,
j,theinteraction variables drop out and (19) reduces to the form of
equations estimated in Table 2. It also follows from (17) and (18) that
when a,13. the regression coefficient on B is a measure of (A2A1), the
difference in trial propensities between defendants released and not re-
leased on bail.
Estimates of (A2 —A1)from Table 2 for the U.S.andnon-South
imply, for example, that the release of an additional 20 defendants on
bail, other things the same, would lead to a desired increase of about 7
to 10 trials as a result of the reduction in trial costs associated with
making bail. One can also get a rough idea of the increased demand for
trial if the existing bail system were replaced with a system of preventive
detention that released all defendants except a few "hard-core" criminal
suspects (for example, 10 per cent). The weighted means of T and B are
about .18 and .45 respectively. Therefore, the release of additional de-
fendants to bring the number released to 90 per cent would lead to an in-
crease in the fraction desiring trials from 18 per cent to between 34 and
40 per cent, or roughly a 100 per cent increase in desired trials.44
Although no direct measures of trial queues are available in the ABF
data, longer trial queues are generally thought to exist in large urban
areas. If the county population variable is interpreted as an imperfect
proxy for the difference between trial queues and settlement queues, the
sign of the regression coefficient on the population variable would de-
pend on the relative strength of two opposing forces. On the one hand,
longer queues discourage trials, but on the other hand, longer queues may
44. This is the increase in trials desired with no change in the trial queue. With an in-
creased demand and unchanged court capacity the queue would presumably grow so that
the actual increase in Twouldbe less than the desired increase. In fact, if the courts were
fully employed, the queue would grow until the costs of waiting were just sufficient to make
desired trials equal to the previous level of trials.I
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be the result of an increased demand for trials. In Table 2, the coefficient
on the population variable is positive and significant in all regressions,
which suggests that the positive association of trials with queues domi-
nates. 2
Further evidence on the effects of population size appears in Table 3
where separate regressions are given for counties in the non-South with
populations greater than 450,000, between 100,000 and 450,000, and less
than 100,000, and in the South with populations greater than 200,000
and less than 108,000. In Table 3 not only does the bail variable continue
to have a positive effect on trials in all non-South equations, but its
(5
coefficient(or (A2 —A1))has a systematically greater value as county size >.
rises(.09 in eq. 3.3, .31 in eq. 3.2, and .75ineq. 3.1), which is precisely
what one would expect if (Q1— Q,,) waspositively correlated with
county population.45 (A2 —A1)is statistically significant in the non-South
except in counties of less than 100,000. This result could be observed if
the difference between (Q,— Q,,) wasnegligible in small counties. More-
over, the empirical finding that the coefficient on the bail variable in-
creases as county population size rises is indirect evidence that (Qe— (5
isin fact larger in counties with bigger populations.
Let us briefly consider the empirical results for the South. The three
regression coefficients on the bail variable in the South in Tables 2 and 3, o
were negative and not significantly different than zero. One possible ex-
planation is that (Q,— isnegligible for counties sampled in the South
so that (A2 —A1)would approach zero, and hence the regression coeffi-
cients on bail would not be significant.46 A second explanation is that
greater measurement errors in the bail variable may exist in the South
compared to the non-South, which would lower the value of regression
coefficients on bail in the South relative to the non-South. Along these
lines it might be argued that justice is more informally administered in
the South, particularly in rural areas, and this would produce poorer
records on bail. (A similar argument may be used to rationalize the non-
significant but positive bail coefficient in non-Southern counties of less
than 100,000.) However, it is questionable whether this argument should
be given much weight since a nonsignificant bail variable was also ob-
45.Ifwe refer to Figure I, supra,wenote that at a given value of (Q, —Q,,)the dif-
ference getween D2andD1equals X, X, —increases
increasein bail costs of defendants not released compared to defendants released.
46. Data for the federal courts indicate that queues are somewhat lower in the South.
In 1966, the mean civil Q,'s were 22.0 and 15.7 months for the non-South and South, and
the mean criminal Q,'s were 6.3 and 5.3 months in the two areas. However, (Q, —Q)
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served for the South in counties with populations greater than 200,000.
Although a sufficient explanation is not available for the South, the
overall results of Tables 2 and 3 give strong support to the hypothesis
that the frequency of trials is greater among defendants released on bail
than those not released. A positive and statistically significant relationship
between bail and trials was observed for the U.S. and the non-South, and
the latter region included more than three-fourths of our observations.
This finding is consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model that
the costs of going to trial compared to settling are increased by not mak-
ing bail, which in turn reduces the likelihood of a trial.
Several additional comments on the results in Tables 2 and 3 are in
order. (1) It might be argued that the bail variable is a proxy for wealth
so that a finding that T increases with B is due to differences in wealth and
not to greater trial costs for those not released. First, there is nothing
in the theoretical analysis that indicates that wealth directly affects the
choice between a trial and a settlement. If wealth were positively corre-
lated with the ability to make bail, one would observe wealthier de-
fendants going to trial, but the theoretical explanation lies with dif-
ferences in costs not differences in wealth. Second, the empirical analysis
of the U.S. courts in the next section contains indirect estimates of a de-
fendant's wealth which show that increases in wealth have no observable
positive effect on trials. (2) A second criticism, which if valid would
weaken my conclusion that increases in B lead to increases in T, is that
spurious correlation exists between B and T. The argument can be made
that defendants planning to plead guilty will not be willing to incur the
costs of making bail, while those planning to go to trial will incur these
costs. If this were true, an increase in T would lead to an observed in-
crease in B and not the reverse. Although this argument has some plausi-
bility, it has a defect. A defendant planning a guilty plea presumably
desires the most favorable terms in a settlement. We showed in the model
that one effect of not making bail is to raise the probability of conviction
in a trial, which in turn results in worse settlement terms. Therefore, it is
not obvious that the defendant planning to settle will find it any less de-
sirable to post bail than the defendant planning a trial, since both suffer
losses from not being released on bail. (3) The regression coefficients on
the sentence variable, 5, do not support the hypothesis that the likelihood
of a trial is greater for defendants accused of crimes carrying longer
sentences. In 4 of 8 equations in Tables 2 and 3 the sign of S was positive,
and in only one equation (3.4), where S had a negative effect, was the
variable significant. The inconclusive behavior of S may partly be at-
tributed to the data.
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S may partly be at-
tributed to the data. The theoretical analysis calls for a variable that
measures the average severity of offenses for defendants sampled in each
county in 1962, while data limitations have forced us to use the average
time served by all felons in a state who were first released in 1964. For-
tunately, the regressions for the U.S. courts provide us with a stronger
test of the sentence hypothesis because data on sentences in the U.S.
courts correspond more closely to the theoretical requirements. (4) The
NW, Ur and Y variables, which are included in the regressions of Tables
2 and 3, should be viewed as demographic characteristics of counties
rather than as indicators of socioeconomic classes of defendants, since
the relation of these variables to defendants may be remote. There are no
prior expectations on the effects of these variables on trials, and their
regression coefficients do not show a consistent pattern. In Table 2 Yand
NW have negative effects on T in the non-South and positive effects in
the South, while Ur has a positive effect in the non-South and a negative
effect in the South. About two-thirds of the NW, Ur and Y regression co-
efficients are not statistically significant.47
U.S. COURTS
Least-squares regression equations were estimated across U.S. district
courts in 1967 of the following form:
(20)
All variables are in natural logs except Re and hence the regression co-
efficients are elasticity measures. The variables in (20) are defined as
follows:
T1: ratio of defendants whose cases were disposed of by trials during 1967 to
the total number of defendants disposed of in 1967. Regressions were also fitted
on T2 which equals the ratio of trials to defendants for 1968.
Q: weighted average of median time intervals from filing to disposition by
court trial and by jury trial in 1967, where weights are the proportion of court
and jury trials respectively.
Q9: median time interval from filing to disposition by a plea of guilty in 1967.
S: weighted average of sentences received by convicted defendants whose
47. Regressions were also estimated without the NW, Ur and Y variables. The regres-
sion results for the bail, population, and sentence variables were largely unaffected.192 AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS
00
cases were disposed of in 1967, where weights are the proportion of convicted
defendants receiving each type of sentence.48
D: proportion of criminal defendants disposed of in 1967 who are assigned
counsel by the court under provisions of the Federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964.
The Act provides for counsel when defendants are unable to pay all or part of
their legal fees.49 Thus, D is a direct measure of the fraction of defendants with
subsidized legal counsel. Since the ability to pay for counsel is related to the de-
fendant's wealth, D would also serve as a rough measure of the fraction of de-
fendants with low incomes or wealth.
Re: region dummy variable where 1 is assigned to district courts in the South
and 0 to district courts in the non-South. 0
I-
Dataon Qtareavailable for only 44 of 89 district courts in 1967 (see
note b to Table 4), while data on QtandQ,,arenot available for other
years. Regressions were first estimated for the 44 districts in 1967. How-
ever, in order to incorporate observations for the remaining districts, and
to work with years other than 1967, a proxy variable forwasused that
cart be computed for all years and districts. The proxy forinyear ,n
is the ratio of pending cases (Pc) at the end of year ni-i to the average
annual number of cases that go to trial (T) in years in and in-i. One would
expect Pc to estimate the backlog and T to roughly measure the availabil-
ity of trial services, and hence should serve as a measure ofeven
though not all pending cases eventually go to trial.50 The accuracy of
_________________________
0
48. Obvious problems arise in evaluating a diversity of sentences that include imprison-
ment, fines, probation with and without supervision, suspended sentence, etc. The Ad- La
ministrativeOffice of the U.S. Courts has devised a common set of values for these sen-
tences (see Fed. Offenders, supranote40, at 4) that assign 0 to suspended sentences and
probation without supervision, 1—4 for fines and various terms of probation with super-
vision, and 3—50 for imprisonment with sentences that range from Ito more than 120
months.Although higher values are generally given to more severe sentences, the method
is still arbitrary. For example, why all fines and probation with supervision from 1 to 12
months are both assigned the value 1is never explained. Nevertheless, the use of this
variable as an estimate of the average potential sentences of accused defendants in each
district seems preferable to using just the mean prison sentence, since the latter group 2
includes only 38 per cent of all defendants disposed of in 1967, while the former group in-
eludes 77 per cent. Both measures suffer because they exclude defendants not convicted
when the relevant theoretical variable is the average potential sentence faced by all de-
fendants before disposition of their case.
49. See The Courts, supranote28, at 59—6 1.
50. There were 10,771 pending criminal cases in the beginning of fiscal year 1967, and
3,924 trials in the 1967 fiscal year. Since the average trial queue is about six months, this
would suggest as a first approximation that roughly one-half of the trials in 1967 were from
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NOTES TO TABLE 4
SOURCES—TI, Q,, PcITforequations 4.1 through 4.5 are from 1967 Ann. Rep.,
Admin. Office of the United States Courts, tables D6, Dl, C7; T2 for equations 4.1 through
4.5 is from 1968 Ann. Rep., Admin. Office of the United States Courts, table D6; S and
W for equations 4.1 through 4.5 are from Fed. Offenders in the United States District Courts
1967, tables Dl0, Dli; T, PcI T,E(T) in equations 4.6 and 4.7 are from 1960 Ann. Rep.
Admin. Office of the United States Courts tables C7, Dl, D3, D4; S for equations 4.6 and
4.7 is from U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Federal Prisons 1960, table 20.
Weighted by where,iisthe number of defendants disposed (equations 4.1 through
4.5) and the number of cases commenced (equations 4.6 and 4.7). All variables except Re
are in natural logarithms.
is the district average of the median court trial queue and median jury trial queue.
Data on either median were available only if there were at least 25 observations for that
type of trial. 44 out of 89 districts had figures on at least one of two trial queues. Since most
trials are jury trials (about 67 per cent), 29 out of the above 44 districts did not publish any
information on court trial queues. The latter were estimated by assuming the ratio of the
court trial to jury trial queue in the circuit (the 89 district courts are divided into ten circuits)
was equal to the ratio in the district. Information was available on the aggregated circuit
level, and hence the median court trial queue in a district could be directly estimated. Esti-
mates were generally required in districts that had a small proportion of court relative to
jury trials. Therefore, any errors in estimating the court trial queue would have a small effect
on the weighted average Q,. Finally, note that in 5 districts the queue for court trials but not
jury trials was available. The procedure described above was then used to estimate the jury
trial queue.
E(T)inthe ith district equals T where Tis the proportion of defendants
in the jth offense category whose cases were disposed of by trial for all districts taken to-
gether in 1960, andis the proportion of defendants accused of the jth offense in district i.
There were 16 offense categories. Thus, variations in E(T) across districts are due solely to
differences in the composition of offenses. E(T) was devised to take account of the possi-
bility that differences in the fraction of trials across districts were the result of E(T)rather
than the queue. Data did not permit a similar calculation for 1967—68.
IIIn1960 there were 86 district courts. By 1967 there were 89 district courts as several
were eliminated and new ones were added. There are several small differences between the
1960 and 1967 data. They are: (I) T is the ratio of the number of cases that went to trial
over the number of cases commenced in 1960. This differs from 1967 where the trial data
are for defendants not cases, and the denominator is disposed defendants not commenced
cases. In a given year the number of new defendants is about 25 per cent greater than the
number of cases commenced, indicating that the number of cases with more than one de-
fendant exceed the number of defendants involved in more than one case. Since this is
reflected in the numerator of the trial variable as well, the correlation in a given year between
T for cases and defendants would be very high; (2) S in 1960 is the average prison sentence
of convicted defendants, and excludes defendants who were fined or put on probation with
supervision. The latter groups are included in the 1967 S variable.
Regressions computed from districts in 1960 that match those districts in 1967 that
had data on Q,.
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Pc/T as an estimate of trial queues was checked by running simple re-
gressions of and(Qt —Q,) onPc/T.51 These equations indicate
that PcIT is positively and significantly related to and — ac-
counting for nearly half the variation in these variables. Although PcI?
is also positively related to itis substantially more important in ex-
plaining variations inand — Q,,). Therefore,Pc/T is not merely a
measure of general delay in the disposition of criminal cases, but, on the
contrary, is a measure of differential delay between trials and guilty pleas.
This result allows us to estimate regressions for all 89 district courts in
1967, and to check the stability of the model over time by fitting equa-
tions to an earlier year, 1960, in which direct data on queues were absent.
If equation (20) estimates a demand curve for trials, the theoretical
analysis predicts that the regression coefficient on (andPcIT) will be
negative, and the regression coefficient onwillbe positive. However,
single-equation estimates may identify a supply curve instead, if the
demand for trials varied more than the supply across districts. In the latter
case, higher observed values forwouldhave resulted from shifts to
the right in demand curves, giving rise to a positive coefficient on Qt.
Similarbehavior would produce a negative coefficient on Q9ifa reduction
in guilty pleas lowered 1have attempted to deal with this identifica-
tion problem in two ways: (1) Equation (20) includes S and D variables
that are expected to lead to shifts in the demand for trials. By holding S
and D constant, the likelihood of identifying a demand curve is increased.
A region variable, Re, also enters equation (20), but it is not obvious that
Re operates more on the demand than supply side of trials. (2) Regressions
have been estimated with a 1968 trial variable, T2, against 1967 values of
Q,andIfdefendants and prosecutors form their expectations about
current queues on the basis of last year's queue, thenin1967 could
still be inversely related to T2 even though demand shifts in 1967 had
caused a positive correlation between T1 and Qt.










Pc/t. Q,, and (Q, —are in natural logs, and all observations are weighted by \/n
where iiisthe number of defendants disposed of in each district in 1967.196 AN ECONOMiC ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS
Regression estimates of equation (20) are presented in Table 4 for the
years 1960, 1967, and 1968. In districts where Q1and areavailable,
the regression results strongly support the hypothesis that increases in
Qt,holding constant,have significant negative effects on T1 and T2,
and increases in withconstant,have significant positive effects on
T1 and T2. When Pc/T is substituted for Q1,inequations 4.2 and 4.4,
Pc/T has the predicted negative sign and is statistically significant, while
Q,,hasthe same effects on T1 and T2 as before.52 Further, when the
sample is expanded to include all 89 districts in equation 4.5, the signs and
significance of andPc/T are similar to the results for the 44 districts.
This suggests that any biases in estimating the effects of queues on trial
demand due to excluding 45 districts in equations 4. 1—4.4 are probably of
small magnitude. Estimation of regressions for 1960 indicates that for all
districts (equation 4.6) the queue, as measured by Pc/T, had about the
same effects as in 1967 and 1968. However, for districts in 1960 that
match the districts in which Q,wereavailable in 1967 (equation 4.7), the
regression coefficient of Pc/D was still negative but with a smaller abso-
lute value. The latter partially results from the absence in 1960 of a mea-
sure of Since andPelT are positively correlated, part of the
positive effect ofontrials would be picked up by Pc/T which, in turn,
would diminish the negative effect of Pc/T on trials. I have tested this for
1967 by reestimating equation 4.2 without whichreduces the re-
gression coefficient of Pc/i from —.407 to —.331.
Although the regressions in Table 4 are consistent with the hypoth-
esis on Qtand theseresults contain an interesting puzzle. In both
equations 4.1and 4.3,trialsare substantially more responsive to
changes inthanQ,.Onepossible explanation is that errors in measure-
ment are more important in than Qt isbased on a sample of de-
fendants that in each district averages less than 25 per cent of the sample
size of and in addition, Qt often had to be estimated because either
data on the jury trial queue or the court trial queue were absent (see note
b in Table 4).53
52. The significance of Q,, improves with this substitution, and the R2's rise. The
former is due to the substantially higher correlation between Q,, and Q than between Q,.
and PcI?(.54compared to .24), while the latter is related to some spurious negative cor-
relation since trials are present in the denominator of Pc/Tandthe numerator of T, and T2.
This spurious correlation probably explains why the absolute value of the regression co-
efficient of PcI? is larger than Q,.
53. Errors in measurement of Q, would also bias downward the regression coefficient
of Q,, since the regression coefficient of Q, and the partial correlation between Qt and
are of opposite signs. See G. C. Chow, Demand for Automobiles in the United States, A
Study in Consumer Durables app. 1(13 Contributions to Economic Analysis 1957).
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The effects on trial demand of the remaining variables in Table 4
may be summarized as follows: (1) S has a positive sign in all regressions
as predicted by the theoretical analysis, and is statistically significant in
the 1967 equations. The lack of significance in equations 4.3 and 4.4 is
probably due to the fact that T2 denotes defendants going to trial in 1968,
whereas S refers to defendants sentenced in 1967. The nonsignificance of
S in 1960 reflects the less comprehensive measure of S in that year. S is
the average prison sentence in 1960, while in 1967, S includes defendants
who were fined, placed on probation, and sentenced to prison. (2) D
measures the fraction of defendants with subsidized legal counsel. These
subsidies reduce the cost of a trial relative to a settlement, providing un-
subsidized legal fees are greater for the former than the latter, and this in
turn increases the demand for trials. The results of Table 4 support this
hypothesis. The coefficient on D is positive in all regressions and sig-
nificant in 4 out of 5 equations. This finding is relevant to the previous
analysis of state courts where it was shown that defendants making bail
had higher trial propensities. The latter was explained in terms of cost
differentials between a trial and settlement that were greater for defend-
ants not making bail. However, an alternative explanation was that
wealthy persons were more likely to go to trial, and hence the observed
relation between bail and trials resulted from the positive correlation
between wealth and the ability to make bail. The analysis of the U.S.
courts does not support this view. If differences in wealth per se were an
important determinant of trial demand and wealthier defendants were
more likely to go to trial, then the coefficient on D would have had a nega-
tive sign, since D should be inversely related to the fraction of wealthy
defendants in a district. Thus, the results in Table 4, together with the
findings for state courts, indicate that the cost differential between trials
and settlements, and not differences in wealth among defendants, is an
important factor in trial demand.54 (3) The South dummy variable, Re,
had no systematic effect on trials in Table 3, which contrasts with the
strong positive effect of Re in the state data. This is not surprising, since
the region effect in the state courts may have picked up the effect of lower
trial queues in the South, whereas queues were held constant in the U.S.
courts.
54. If one still believed that wealth was an important variable in trial demand, then the
observed positive coefficients on D would show that wealthier defendants were less likely
to go to trial. This contradicts the results of the state data which showed that wealthier
defendants were morelikelyto go to trial. One final note is that if wealth were a determinant
of the ability to make bail in the U.S. courts, then the coefficient on D could have a negative
sign. However, the Bail Reform Act (to the extent it is effective) would have reduced or
eliminated the correlation between wealth and the ability to make bail.198 AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS
THE PROBABILITY OF CONVICTION
k
STATE COUNTY COURTS
The theoretical analysis predicted that if the defendant were not released
on bail, the costs of his resource inputs would rise, leading to a reduction U
in these inputs and an increase in the probability of conviction. Therefore,
a decline in the fraction of defendants making bail should result in an
increase in the fraction of defendants convicted. A major difficulty in
testing this hypothesis relates to the direction of causation between the 0
bailand conviction variables. At the time bail is set a prima facie case is
often made against the accused. If the preliminary evidence points to his
guilt, a higher bail bond is likely to be set, which would lower his chance —
ofbeing released. Hence, a selection process would take place before
the final disposition of cases whereby defendants with a higher probability
of conviction would be less likely to make bail. I have attempted to deal
with this problem by including as independent variables both the fraction
of defendants released on bail (B) and the average money bail charge (C)
in regressions on the fraction of defendants convicted. Since setting a high
money bail is a method of detaining a defendant with a high initial prob- m
ability of conviction, then including C as an independent variable has the
effect of holding constant differences across counties in these prob-
abilities.55 This in turn would remove from the regression coefficient on B
any negative correlation due to higher conviction probabilities reducing
the fraction of defendants released on bail.
Weighted regression equations of the form
P =a+ /31B + /32Pop + I3aRe + /34NW + f35Ur + f36Y+/37C + + U
0
(21)
are presented in Table 5. B, Pop, Re, NW, Ur, Y and T are defined as
before (see pp. 184—85) and P and C are defined as follows:
P: the fraction of felony defendants sentenced to prison in each county. Some
convicted felony defendants received only fines so that P understates the total
I-
55.The inclusion of Cisonly an approximation to holding constant variations in the
probabilities because C may reflect other factors as well. For example, the severity of the





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































,200 AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS
number of defendants receiving penalties. However, data available in a few
counties indicate that the fraction of defendants receiving only fines was
negligible.
C: average dollar amount of bail set for defendants in each county.
The negative and statistically significant effect of B in equation 5.1 reflects
in part the negative correlation described above that runs from P to B.
C has a positive effect on P in equation 5.2, suggesting that defendants
with greater conviction probabilities had C set at higher amounts.56 As
expected both the absolute value of the regression coefficient on B and
its significance are reduced when C is entered. We have previously shown
that defendants released on bail have greater propensities to go to trial.
One would like to determine to what extent the observed effect of B on P
in 5.2 is due to differences in the method of disposition of cases (that is,
trials versus settlements) between defendants released and not released
on bail. In equation 5.3 a trial variable (T) has been added. T further re-
duces the regression coefficient of B and its significance because de-
fendants going to trial are less likely to be sentenced to prison (that is, the
regression coefficient on T is negative and significant) and more likely to
make bail. In sum, the results of equations 5.1—5.3 support the hypothe-
sis that the probability of conviction is increased for a defendant when he
is not released on bail. At the mean values of P and B (both are about .5)
the regression coefficient on B in 5.3 implies that the frequency of prison
convictions is .38 for defendants released on bail and .62 for defendants
not released, holding C and T constant. Observe that the coefficient of B
is reduced by about 40 per cent when C and T are held constant— 15
per cent due to C and 25 per cent due to T.
Regressions are also presented in Table 5 on the fraction of defend-
ants dismissed (Ds) and the fraction acquitted (A). These results confirm
the previous findings that defendants released on bail are less likely to be
convicted. The regression coefficients on B are positive in all three equa-
tions where C and T are held constant, and statistically significant in two.
Note that 15 per cent of defendants in the sample were acquitted or dis-
missed, 50 per cent were sentenced to prison, while the remaining 35
per cent were generally given suspended sentences or placed on proba-
tion. The latter type of sentences, where the defendant's costs are small
56. Data on Care available in only 70 of the 132 counties used in analysis of trials in
county courts. The exclusion of 62 counties does not create any obvious biases since a
regression computed for all 132 counties without C (equation 5.7) yields similar coefficients
to equation 5.1.
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in comparison to prison sentences, should probably be viewed as non-
convictions. For this reason P would be a better measure of convictions
than 1 —(Ds+ A). The positive though nonsignificant coefficients on C
in the Ds and A regressions suggest that increases in defendants sen-
tenced to prison as C rises, which are found in equations 5.2 and 5.3,
come from a reduction in probations and suspended sentences rather
than from fewer dismissals and acquittals.
Other findings in Table 5 may be summarized as follows. (1) The
population variable generally has a positive effect on convictions, indi-
cating that longer trial queues across counties tend to increase the fraction
of convictions. One should be cautious with this interpretation because
of the uncertain relation between queues and population size and the lack
of strong statistical significance of the population variable. (2) The demo-
graphic variables, NW,Urand Y are not statistically significant in any
regression. (3) An additional problem relates to the interpretation of the
regression coefficient of B. Although a negativeeffectof B on convic-
tions is found, this could be due to a greater average wealth rather than to
a lower cost of resources for defendants released on bail. The relation-
ship between wealth and convictions will be examined in the analysis of
the U.S. court data.
Data on judicial expenditures in 1966—67 are available for twenty
counties with populations greater than 450,000. A reasonable assumption
is that these expenditures are positively correlated with the size of the
prosecutor's budget in a county. We would then predict from the theoreti-
cal analysis that the proportion of defendants convicted would be
greater in counties with larger judicial expenditures per defendant. This
hypothesis is consistent with findings in Table 6 where judicial expendi-
tures, denoted by J, have a positive effect on convictions in all regres-
sions.57 The primary effect of an increase in J is to reduce the proportion
of cases dismissed, while there is no significant effect on acquittals.
Moreover, the increase in the fraction of defendants going to prison as J
rises can be accounted for solely by a reduction in dismissals. At the mean
values of J, Ds and P, a 15 per cent rise in J reduces Ds from .13 to .11
and increases P from about .50 to .52. Thus, the major economizing move
as judicial expenditures fall is to reduce the number of cases prosecuted
—hence an increase in dismissals.
57. J is notdivided bythe number of defertdants in a county because this information is
not available.However,population size,whichisprobably positively correlated with the
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2WILLIAM M. LANDES 203
U.S. COURTS
Two conviction variables are used in regressions computed across U.S.
districtcourts in 1967. "S
P:the fraction of defendants sentenced to prison.
Cl) F:the fraction of defendants receiving a fine only.
• Prisonsentences were more numerous than fines as the weighted means
of P and F were .38 and .07 respectively in the 89 districts.
Of considerable interest in Table 7 is the behavior of the variable D,
the proportion of defendants assigned counsel by the court. D has a posi-
tive and significant effect on P, and a negative though nonsignificant
L
effecton F in all equations. This suggests that increases in wealth of de-
reduce (increase) the frequency of convictions for offenses
carrying prison sentences (fines) since D serves as a proxy variable for
the
fraction of lower income defendants in a district (see p. 192). These
findings are consistent with a "wealth" hypothesis developed in the.
theoretical section which predicted for risk neutral defendants that (a)
whenpenalties were in the form of jail sentences a rise in wealth would
lead to an increase in the defendant's resource inputs and a subsequent
fall in the probability of Conviction and (b) when penalties are in the form
of fines an increase in wealth would lower his inputs and raise the prob-
ability of conviction. A related interpretation of the increase in P as D
rises is that court-assigned lawyers are less effective and less able than
a privatelyhired lawyers. This is not at variance with the "wealth" hypoth-
esis because more able lawyers can be counted as more units of the de-
fendant'sresource inputs than less able ones. However, the ability ex-
. E planation would also predict that privately hired lawyers would reduce
the conviction rate on fines, and the reverse is found in Table
An increase in delay between a trial and settlement is associated with
an increase in the fraction of defendants sentenced to prison. The coetfi-
T cients are positive for Qt and PcI? and negative for Qp in the P regres-
sions in Table 7. We also observed in the state data that the population
Cl)
58. Apossible reconciliation is that more able lawyers are able to lower the de-
' fendant'sconviction costs by shifting penalties from prison sentences to fines. This ex-
o planation would be consistent with both a positive effect of DonPanda negative effect of V.' • .
Don F. Another possible interpretation of the observed effects of D on P and F is that in
districts where wealth is higher (and hence D lower) the types of crimes committed are more




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The model developed in this essay utilizes two behavioral assumptions:
the prosecutor maximizes the expected number of convictions weighted
by their sentences, subject to a budget constraint, and the defendant
maximizes the expected utility of his endowments in various states of the
world. Both participants can influence the probability of conviction by
their input of resources into the case, and cases are disposed of either by
a trial or a voluntary pretrial settlement between the prosecutor and de-
fendant. A settlement results in either a dismissal or a guilty plea. The
major implications of the model are the following:
1. A settlement is more likely to take place (a) the smaller the sen-
tence if convicted by trial, (b) the greater the resource costs of a trial
compared to a settlement, (c) the greater the defendant's aversion to risk,
and (d) the greater the defendant's estimate of the probability of convic-
tion by trial relative to the prosecutor's estimate. We further showed that
if the defendant and prosecutor agree on the expected outcome of a trial,
a decision to go to trial is analogous to accepting an unfair gamble. In this
instance, a settlement would result for risk neutral and risk averse de-
fendants.
2. The defendant's investment of resources into his case is related
both to the sentence if convicted by trial and to wealth. Generally, the
59.TheAdministrative Office of the U.S. Courts assigns the value I to fines and 3 to
imprisonment of 1to 6 months in calculating a weighted average of the severity of all
sentences (see Fed. Offenders, supranote40, at 35,table10 and note 48, supra).Thisin-
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variable (interpreted as a proxy for trial delay) had a positive effect on
convictions. One reason for the positive association between trial delay
and prison convictions may be that the prosecutor becomes more selec-
tive with respect to the cases he prosecutes as trial delay increases. That
is, he selects from an inventory of cases the ones he believes to have the
greatest probability of conviction and the highest sentences if convicted
in order to maximize his weighted conviction function. Moreover, if the
prosecutor views fines as light penalties in comparison to jail sentences,59
we would expect a negative relation between trial delay and the frequency
of defendants fined. The equations on• F give some support to this hy-
pothesis although the regression coefficients on the Qi and Pc/T variables
are not significant.
















'l'resource investment is greater for crimes carrying larger sentences. Under
the special assumption of risk neutrality (or presumably where the devia-
tion from risk neutrality is small), increases in the defendant's wealth lead
to greater resource investments when penalties are jail sentences and to
smaller investments when penalties are money fines.
3. Court delays increase the opportunity costs of a trial compared to
a settlement for defendants not released on bail. This leads to a smaller
likelihood of going to trial for these defendants than for defendants re-
leased on bail. The greater the court delay the greater the difference in
trial demand between the two groups. Pretrial detention also raises the
marginal costs of the defendant's resources and hence lowers his input.
Therefore, defendants not released on bail are likely to have higher con-
viction probabilities in a trial and receive longer sentences if they settle
than defendants released on bail. If making bail is a positive function of
wealth, then the effects of pretrial jailing fall primarily on low-income de-
fendants. We argued that paying a defendant not released on bail for time
spent in jail prior to disposition of his case, or alternatively, crediting him
for this time towards his eventual sentence and paying him only if he is
not convicted would eliminate much of the "discriminatory" aspects of
the current bail system.
4. In the absence of money pricing for the courts a trial queue arises
to ration the limited supply. An equilibrium queue is reached because trial
costs increase with the length of the queue. Queues could be reduced by
charging a money price for trials, which reduces demand, leading to more
settlements. Various methods of allocating the court fee—loser pays,
winner pays, defendant and prosecutor share the cost—are consistent
with a downward sloping demand curve for trials. Pricing trials will not
onLy reduce delay but can also distribute trials more equally among de-
fendants independent of their ability to make bail.
Available data on criminal defendants in state county courts and in
U.S. district courts enabled us to test a number of the hypotheses de-
veloped in the theoretical analysis. Multiple regressions were estimated
for various cross sections in selected years from 1957 to 1968. The prin-
cipal findings of the empirical analysis may be summarized as follows.
1. The propensity to go to trial was smaller for defendants not re-
leased on bail than defendants released, holding constant the average
sentence and several demographic variables. This was observed for state
county courts in the United States as a whole, and the non-South. More-
over, results from the U.S. district courts indirectly indicate that in-
creases in wealth do not increase trial demand. Thus, the observed rela-
tion between bail and trials in state courts is probably due to cost dif-
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2. The absolute difference in trial propensities between defendants
released and not released on bail increased as county population rose.
One explanation for this finding is that court delay is greater in counties
with larger populations. Note that direct measures of court delay were not
available for the state courts.
3. Trial demand was negatively related to trial delay and positively
related to settlement delay across U.S. district courts for 1960, 1967,
and 1968. Thus, as the queue differentialbetween a trial and settlement in-
creased, the demand for trials fell.
4. Subsidizing defendant's legal fees in the U.S. district courts in-
creased the demand for trials. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
as the cost differential between a trial and settlement falls, the demand for
trials increases.
5.Districtcourts in which the average sentence was greater had
proportionately more trials as predicted by the model. However, the re-
sults for the sentence variable in the county courts were inconclusive.
The latter may be due to the crudity of the sentence variable used in
counties.
6. The probability of conviction as measured by the proportion of
defendants sentenced to prison was greater for defendants not released
on bail than for defendants released on bail in county courts. This was
observed in regressions which held constant, among other factors, both
the size of money bail and the method of disposition (that is, trial or
settlement). Money bail was included as an independent variable to re-
duce spurious correlation between the conviction and bail variables since
defendants who were more likely to be convicted were also likely to have
bail set at higher amounts, reducing their chance of release on bail. Re-
gressions using the proportion of defendants acquitted and dismissed as
the dependent variable supported the finding that defendants not released
on bail were more likely to be convicted.
7. Convictions leading to prison sentences were lower in districts
where estimates of the average wealth were higher, while Convictions re-
suiting in monetary fines were greater where average wealth was higher.
One interpretation of this result is that the effect of wealth on the de-
fendant's investment of resources into his case depended on whether
penalties were jail sentences or fines.
8. Conviction rates were higher in district courts where trial delay
was greater, and in county courts where judicial expenditures were
larger. The former may result from a greater selectivity on the part of208 AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS
the prosecutor with respect to cases he prosecutes as the backlog in-
creases. The latter was consistent with the hypothesis that the size of the
prosecutor's budget determined the proportion of defendants convicted.
APPENDIX A
CIVIL CASES
We can extend our model to make it applicable to civil cases. The plaintiff
replaces the prosecutor. Damages replace sentences. Both the plaintiff and de-
fendant maximize their expected utility. It is assumed that civil trials decide
both the question of the defendant's liability and the amount of damages. Only the
defendant's guilt was at issue in criminal cases; the sentence if convicted was
fixed and known prior to trial. A similar assumption for damages is not justified
because statutory penalties generally do not exist for various types of civil suits.
This modification requires that the plaintiff and defendant form expectations not
only on the probability of the defendant being found liable, but also on the size
of damages. With these changes, the analysis of civil cases remains quite similar
to the model for criminal cases. To avoid excessive duplication I present only a
brief outline of the civil model and its more important results.
In civil suits the plaintiff and defendant each select a level of resource inputs
that maximizes his expected utility in the event of a trial. The plaintiff's inputs
raise both the estimates of the probability that the defendant will be found liable
and the amount of damages awarded in a trial, while the defendant's inputs lower
these estimates. The plaintiff will determine a settlement payment (=X) that
yields him the same utility as his expected utility from a trial. X would be the mini-
mum sum accepted by the plaintiff to settle. If the payment of X by the defendant
yields him a higher utility than his expected utility from a trial, a settlement will
take place. This follows because one can find a payment somewhat greater than X
that gives both parties a higher utility from a settlement than their expected utili-
ties from a trial. It can further be shown that a settlement is likely when the follow-
ing factors are present: (1) both parties have similar expectations on the proba-
bility that the defendant will be found liable in a trial; (2) both parties have similar
estimates of the damages, given that the defendant is found liable in a trial; (3)
neither party has strong preferences for risk; (4) the costs of a trial including
lawyer's fees, time costs of the plaintiff and defendant, court fees, etc., exceed
the costs of a settlement. Alternatively, the more dissimilar the plaintiff's and
defendant's estimates of liability and damages (providing the plaintiff's estimates
are higher), the greater their preference for risk, and the lower court costs relative
to settlement costs, the more likely a trial.6°
60. This result is similar to one derived by R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). Coase shows that with well-defined property rights, and in the
absence of transaction costs, a private agreement will be reached between individuals that
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The analysis of charging a money price for the courts, as opposed to queuing
costs, is similar for civil and criminal cases. For example, a money price (M)
will raise the maximum settlement offered by the defendant in a civil suit and
lower the minimum settlement accepted by the plaintiff. M narrows the gap be-
tween what the defendant offers and what the plaintiff is willing to accept (pro-
viding the former was initially less than the latter sum), and increases the likeli-
hood of a settlement. Moreover, the greater M the fewer civil cases that go to
trial. As M falls to zero, the demand for trials will increase and a queue is likely
to develop. The queue rations demand in the following way. As the queue
lengthens, the discounted value of damages awarded in a trial falls. This would
lower both the amount the plaintiff will accept and the amount the defendant will
offer in a settlement. However, there are probably some costs to the defendant
from trial delay.. For example, his ability to dispose of assets (particularly if they
are directly involved in the suit) and his ability to obtain funds in the capital mar-
ket may be adversely affected by his being involved in litigation. If, on the aver-
age, the gains and costs of delay to the defendant offset each other, or the costs
dominate, then the defendant's settlement offer would remain constant or increase
as delay increases. The net effect would be a reduction in desired trials as the
queue lengthened, since the defendant's settlement offer remains constant or in-
creases while the plaintiff reduces the amount he is willing to accept.
There are several additional points on court delay that should be noted. (1)
The analysis of queueing in civil cases is almost identical to criminal cases where
the defendant is released on bail. In the latter, the prosecutor reduces his mini-
mum sentence offer as delay increases, while the defendant's response is affected
by two offsetting forces. Delay pushes his potential sentence from a trial further
into the future, reducing its present value, while simultaneously his current earn-
ings may be adversely affected by being under indictment. (2) A system analogous
to the bail system could be instituted for civil cases. This would require, for ex-
ample, defendants in civil suits to either pay a sum to the court per unit of time,
or forgo the returns from all or part of their assets by depositing them with the
court during the period between filing and disposition of the case. One effect of
this procedure would be to make trial demand more responsive to a change in the
queue as the costs of delay rise to the defendant. This is similar to the greater
responsiveness of criminal trial demand for defendants not released on bail rela-
tive to those released. (3) A requirement that the defendant pay interest on any
sum awarded the plaintiff in a trial would have little effect on trial demand or court
queues. Interest payments would raise both the defendant's settlement offer and
the minimum sum acceptable to the plaintiff in a settlement. Hence, as a first ap-
internalizes externalities. If we interpret the absence of transaction costs in civil cases as
the availability of information on damages at zero cost and zero bargaining costs of a
settlement, and we generalize Coase's notion of well-defined property rights to include iden-
tical expectations over property rights or liability decisions in a trial, then Coase's theorem
on private agreements would also include pretrial settlements in the absence of risk
preference.210 AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS
proximation it would not close the gap between the defendant's offer and the
plaintiff's acceptance sum and, therefore, would have no effect on the trial versus
settlement decision. (4) Differences in the rate at which the plaintiff and de-
fendant discount future damages awarded at a trial can give rise to differences in
the response of trial demand to a change in the queue. The higher the plaintiff's
discount rate relative to the defendant's, the larger the plaintiff's losses and the
smaller the defendant's gains from an increase in the queue. This, in turn, would
reduce the sum acceptable to the plaintiff by a greater amount than it reduces the
defendant's offer, making a settlement more likely.
We can test the hypothesis that the demand for civil trials is negatively re-
lated to the length of the trial queue. The statistical specification of the demand
function is
T=cs+131Q7+/39E(T)+f33Re+p. (22)
Data were from the 86 U.S. district courts in 1957—61. The variables are in
natural log form except Re and are defined as follows:
T: The ratio of the number of trials from cases that commenced in 1957 over
the number of cases commenced in 1957.61
Estimateof the expected trial queue in 1957 where isan ex-
ponentially declining weighted average of 1957, 1956, and 1955 median trial
queues.62 Q,,themedian trial queue in 1956, was also used as an estimate of the
expected trial queue.
61. A frequency distribution of civil cases by length of time from filing to disposition by
trial is published for each yearfrom 1957 to 1961. (After 1961 only median trial queues are
available.) This allows us to trace over time the eventual disposition (that is, trial or settle-
ment) of cases commenced in 1957 assuming all of the latter cases are disposed of within
four years from the date of filing. Since civil trial queues average about one-and-one-half
years in the U.S. courts, a frequency distribution of trials is an important advantage in esti-
mating T, For example, if the number of trials in a given year were used as the numerator of
T, it would be difficult to choose an appropriate denominator for T because the trials were
from cases commenced over several different time periods with an average queueing time to
trial of one-and-one-half years. Moreover, it would be equally difficult to choose a value for
the expected trial queue. Frequency distributions of trials are not available for criminal
cases, but the above problems are not as great since criminal queues average about six
months.
62. Derived from the assumption that persons form expectations of future queues on
the basis of past expectation and adjustment based on ratio of current value to previous
expected value. That is,
Q,=
17 (i)
where Q7's are expected and Q,'s are actual median queues in a district,)' is the year, andy
is the adjustment coefficient. (i) can be rewritten as the following infinite series:
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ving infinite series:
E(T): Expected fraction of trials in a district are estimated by dividing civil
cases commenced in each district in 1957 into five broad groups, and then multi-
plying each group by the fraction of trials in that group for all U.S. district courts
in 1957.63 Therefore, the inclusion of E(T) allows us to hold constant differences
in the distribution of types of cases across districts.
Re: Region dummy variable that equals 1 for district courts in South and 0
for non-South district courts.
Table 8 presents regression estimates of equation (22). Separate regressions
were also computed for districts in the non-South and South. All regression co-
efficients on Q7andhavethe predicted negative signs, are highly significant,
and are of similar magnitude. In sum, these results support the hypothesis that
the demand for trials is negatively related to the size of the trial queue.
A difficulty in interpreting the findings of Table 8 arises from the way in which
the trial variable is measured. An unknown number of civil cases that would come
under the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts are settled before they are filed. Since
these cases are excluded from the denominator of T, the true proportion of civil
cases going to trial in a district each year is less than the observed fraction. This
measurement error in T will not bias the regression coefficients if the error is Un-
correlated with the independent variables. However, we can show that the error
QI Q),... (ii)
in 1957 was approximated in the empirical analysis by using three previous values for
Q,. In logs this becomes
log y log Q,37 + y(l —j)') log -I- y(l — log (iii)
-y was initially set equal to .4, but to have the weights sum to Iall weights were propor-
tionally raised by a factor of 1.2755.
63. Fraction of trials for various categories are as follows:
1. U.S. Plaintiff (excludes land condemnation and forfeiture cases) .031
2. U.S. Defendant (ex. habeas corpus) .188
3. Federal Question (cx. habeas corpus) .123
4. Diversity .151
5. Admiralty .081
Note that 53,343 civil cases were commenced in 1957 in 86 U.S. District Courts and the
number of cases excluded above were 4,613. These were excluded because data on queues
and trials for each district do not include these types of cases. Note that when the U.S.
government is involved in a suit as a defendant there is much greater likelihood of a trial
than when the U.S. is the plaintiff. One explanation is that the costs to the defendant from
delay (that offset the gains from the reduction in the present value of a trial settlement),
such as his inability to dispose of assets or to obtain funds in the capital markets, may not
be present when the defendant is the U.S. government. Hence, for a given queue one would
expect more trials when the U.S. government is the defendant than when it is the plaintiff.212 AN ECONOMICANALYSIS OF THECOURTS
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Ann. Rep., Admin. Off. of the United States Courts, tables Cl,
a Eachobservation weighted by where ,iequalsthe number of cases commenced in
1957.
in T is likely to be positively correlated with the trial queue, and this in turn wifl
bias downward the absolute value of the queue elasticities.64
In Table 8 E(T) has a positive and significant effect on T in the U.S. and non-
South, but a negative and nonsignificant effect in the South. Overall, E(T) was
less important than trial queues in explaining variations in T across districts. Re
which is significant at the .01 level indicates that the fraction of civil trials was
about 30 per cent lower in the South holding the queue and E(T) constant. This
result is puzzling in view of the finding that Re had no significant effect on the
64. Leti =thenumber of trials in a district, Fthe number of cases filed, and C =the
number of cases filed plus those settled before filing. Further, assume that K -F=C,where
K > l. Suppose the relationship between i/C and Q7 is
while the estimating equation is
i/C =Q7sea,
i/F =
whereandare error terms. (ii) can be rewritten as




Let E =logK, Y =log(i/C) and X =log and let e, y, and x denote deviations from
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and x denote deviations from
their respective means. The least-squares estimator of /is
(iv)
which will be an unbiased estimator of /3 only if Coy (x, e) =0.However, it is more likely
that as Q7rises,K will also rise, since the incentives to settle (both before and after filing)
increase with the size of This implies that Coy (x, e) > 0. Given that /3 and /3 are nega-
tive, this would result in 1131underestimating1/31.
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demand for criminal trials in the U.S. courts. A possible explanation is that the
average size of damages in civil suits in the South is considerably lower than in
the non-South. Thus, the negative effect on T of lower damages would be picked
up by the Re variable.
APPENDIX B
MATHEMATICAL NOTES: WEALTH EFFECTS
In this section we analyze the effect of changes in W on R when the defendant
has nonneutral tastes for risk. Risk aversion is assumed. The case of risk pref-
erence can easily be worked out from the example of risk aversion. Inputs of R
are assumed to reduce both P and S (that is, S'aS/OR < 0) in contrast to the
assumption in Section I that S was a constant and independent of R.
The first- and second-order conditions for E(U) to be a maximum may be
written, respectively, as
—P'[(J(Wii) —U(Wc)]—sS'P(J'(Wc)—r[PU'(Wc) ± (1 —P)U'(Wn)]=0(23)
and
—R"[U(Wn) —U(Wc)J+ 2rP'{U'(Wn) —U'(Wc)]+r2[PU"(Wc)
+ (1 —P)U"(Wn)]—2sS'P'U'(Wc)—sS"PU'(Wc)
+ 2rsS'PU(Wc) + (sS')2PU"(Wc) <0.(24)
Relative risk aversion at Wn is defined as follows:
• A(U'n) ——Wn (25)
A(Wc) is similarly defined at Wc. Taking the total differential of (23) with respect
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where r' = > 0, s' =as/aW,k =(1—r'R)and in =(1—s'S—r'R).Note
that 0 < k < 1, 0 < in < I and k > ni. in and k are both positive because an in.
crease in W must increase both Wn and Wc. Even with further simplifying as-
sumptions the sign of (26) is indeterminate. For example, suppose A(Wn)
A(Wc) =1and let Er= r'(W/r) and Es =s'(W/s)where 0Er, Es1. This
gives dR/dW0.
—P'(W — —ErrR)Wc
sS'P[W —(E8Wc+ + ErIR)]
U'(Wn) —rP[W— + E8sS + ErrR)]
Wn . (27)
U (Wc) Wc[—P(W — + r(1 —P)(l—Er)WJ
The sign of dR/dW cannot be determined from (27) without additional informa-
tion about the defendant's utility function, the elasticities of s and r with respect to




In the special case of a Bernoulli utility function, where the utility of wealth equals
its logarithm, then dR/dW =0,since U'(Wn)/U'(Wc) =WclWn.
In general, the effects of changes in wealththe defendant's input of re-
sources are indeterminate once nonneutral tastes for risk are introduced. This
conclusion is valid even when the strong assumption is made that relative risk
aversion equals one for all levels of the defendant's wealth. Nevertheless, one still
presumes that if the deviation from risk neutrality is small, the effects of wealth
on R will be similar to those for risk neutrality.